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APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Report by the Director General

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Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. The Director General's report on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), issued on 18 August 2025, was submitted to the Board of Governors and to the 69th regular session of the General Conference in September 2025 (GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13).
2. Having considered the report of August 2025, the General Conference adopted resolution GC(69)/RES/13 on 18 September 2025 and decided to remain seized of the matter and to include the item on the agenda for its 70th (2026) regular session.
3. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference covers developments since the report of August 2025.

B. Background

4. The Agency has not been able to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's declarations under the Agreement between the DPRK and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (hereinafter referred to as the "NPT Safeguards Agreement").¹ Following ad hoc inspections to verify the information contained in the initial report provided by the DPRK, on 1 April 1993 the Board of Governors found,

¹ The DPRK concluded an agreement with the Agency, based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, for the application of safeguards in respect of a research reactor in July 1977 (INFCIRC/252). Under this item-specific safeguards agreement, safeguards were applied by the Agency to two nuclear research facilities in Yongbyon: the IRT Research Reactor and a critical assembly. Although the DPRK acceded to the NPT in December 1985, its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), only entered into force in April 1992 (INFCIRC/403). As provided for in Article 23 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, the application of safeguards under the earlier safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/252) is suspended while the NPT Safeguards Agreement is in force.

pursuant to Article 19 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, that “the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. The Board decided to report the DPRK’s non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify such non-diversion to all Member States of the Agency, to the UN Security Council and to the UN General Assembly.² Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

5. From November 1994 to December 2002, the Agency maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Yongbyon site to monitor a freeze at five facilities under the Agreed Framework between the United States of America (USA) and the DPRK.³ From July 2007 to April 2009, the Agency maintained a continuous inspector presence at Yongbyon to monitor and verify the status of shut down or sealed facilities under the Initial Actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, agreed by the States parties in the Six Party Talks.⁴ From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able, and since April 2009 has not been able, to implement any safeguards measures in the DPRK.

6. Following the DPRK’s nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2375 (2017). In these resolutions, the UN Security Council, inter alia: demanded that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and IAEA safeguards; decided that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and its existing nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of its NPT Safeguards Agreement; and decided that the DPRK shall provide the Agency with transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the Agency. Contrary to the requirements of those resolutions, the DPRK has not abandoned its existing nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner or ceased all related activities.

7. As the Agency remains unable to carry out verification activities in the DPRK, and as further nuclear activities continue to take place in the country, the Agency’s knowledge of the DPRK’s nuclear programme is limited. Nevertheless, it is important for the Agency to remain cognizant of developments in that programme to the fullest extent possible, especially in light of the General Conference’s support of the Secretariat’s continued enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the capability to re-establish the implementation of safeguards related activities in the DPRK.⁵

C. Developments

8. In September 2025, the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the United Nations Office and International Organisations in Vienna released a statement indicating that the DPRK’s status as a

² GOV/2645 (1993).

³ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 7.

⁴ The States parties in the Six Party Talks process were the People’s Republic of China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the USA.

⁵ GC(69)/RES/13, para. 12.

“nuclear weapons state” had “become irreversible” and asserting that the Agency, which had “not formally established relations with the DPRK for more than 30 years”, had “no legal right ... to interfere in the internal affairs of a nuclear weapons state which exists outside the NPT”.⁶

9. On 25 December 2025, DPRK state media published a series of photographs⁷ depicting a visit of General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and President of the State Affairs Kim Jong Un (hereafter referred to as “General Secretary Kim”) to the construction site of an “8700-tonnage nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine” where he was shown touring the submarine assembly hall. General Secretary Kim stressed the “importance and significance of building a strategic nuclear attack submarine” for the “self-reliant defence policy” of the DPRK.⁸

10. General Secretary Kim told the Ninth Congress of the WPK in February 2026, that the DPRK had a long-term plan to strengthen its “national nuclear force” and would focus on “increasing the number of nuclear weapons” and expanding “the means and space for nuclear operation”.⁹

11. On 6 May 2026, Ambassador Kim Song, Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the United Nations, released a statement in the context of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT indicating that the DPRK had “legally [withdrawn] from the NPT many decades ago”, was “not bound by the NPT in any case”, and that the DPRK’s status as a “nuclear weapons state” did “not change” according to the “unilateral desire of outsiders”.¹⁰

12. On 3 June 2026, General Secretary Kim visited a “newly-inaugurated nuclear materials production factory”.¹¹ DPRK state media released a series of photographs of the visit. According to publicly available information, this is the third series of photographs of uranium enrichment facilities released by DPRK state media.¹² During the visit, General Secretary Kim praised the further strengthening of the “foundation for the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials by settling the problems decisive in putting the production of nuclear materials on a Juche¹³ basis” and said that the “weapons-grade nuclear materials production capacity [had] more than doubled during the past 5-year course of bolstering up the nuclear force”. He referred to “action guidelines for rapidly accelerating the qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the DPRK’s nuclear forces”, saying that the “greatly expanded” production capacity together with the “development of sophisticated nuclear technology” would “offer the possibility of carrying out larger plans”.

⁶ ‘Press Statement of DPRK Permanent Mission to UN Office and International Organizations in Vienna’, DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 September 2025.

⁷ ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Building of Nuclear-powered Strategic Guided Missile Submarine’, KCNA, 25 December 2025.

⁸ Photographs of an earlier visit of General Secretary Kim to the same location were released by DPRK state media on 8 March 2025. See GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 11.

⁹ ‘Let Us Make Great Victory and Glory Gained through Indomitable Pioneering Struggle Lead onto Steady Prosperity and Leaps Forward in New Struggle. Report on Ninth Congress of Workers’ Party of Korea’, KCNA, 27 February 2026.

¹⁰ ‘Press Statement of Permanent Representative of DPRK to UN’, DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 May 2026.

¹¹ ‘Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Gives Field Guidance at Newly-Inaugurated Nuclear Materials Production Factory’, KCNA, 4 June 2026.

¹² The first series of photographs was released on 13 September 2024, and the second on 29 January 2025. See GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, paras 9 and 10, respectively.

¹³ “Juche” is the state ideology of the DPRK and is generally translated as “self-reliance”.

D. Nuclear Programme Update

13. As indicated earlier, the Agency has not been able to implement any safeguards measures in the DPRK since April 2009. Without access to nuclear facilities and other relevant locations in the DPRK, the Agency cannot confirm either the operational status or the configuration/design features of any of the nuclear facilities or locations described in this section, nor can it confirm the nature and purpose of the activities conducted therein. However, the Agency, through the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery and open sources, continues to monitor developments in the DPRK's nuclear programme.

D.1. Mining, Milling and Concentration

14. During the reporting period, there were indications of ongoing mining, milling and concentration activities, as well as some upgrades to infrastructure, at the Pyongsan Uranium Mine and the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant.¹⁴ An expansion in the number of mines and milling activities in the wider area surrounding Pyongsan has also been observed, although it is not possible to determine from satellite imagery analysis whether this is for uranium mining and processing.

15. There were indications during the reporting period of ongoing mining activity at the Wolbisan Uranium Mine.¹⁵ There have been no indications of significant activities at the Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant since commercial high-resolution satellite imagery became available to the Agency in 2001.¹⁶

D.2. Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

16. As previously reported,¹⁷ in 1992 the DPRK declared that it had operated a pilot fuel fabrication plant from 1983 until 1986, when it was decommissioned. The plant was never under Agency safeguards and the Agency was informed subsequently that all operating records had been destroyed in 1991 prior to the entry into force of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in 1992. The Agency observed that, between May 2021 and December 2023, an extension was constructed along the eastern side of the pilot plant building, and by late 2025 a further extension had been added. In early 2026, work started on two new buildings near the southern end of the pilot plant building, and construction work was still ongoing at the end of the reporting period. While the Agency is unable to determine the purpose of these buildings, based on their location and given the history of the pilot fuel fabrication plant, they may be related to conversion and/or fuel fabrication. There were indications of activities in parts of these buildings during the reporting period.¹⁸

17. As previously reported,¹⁹ work commenced in July 2022 on a major renovation of the derelict UF₄ Production Process Building at Yongbyon, and there were indications that by 2024 some of the processes formerly conducted within the UO₂ Production Process Building had been reconstituted in the

¹⁴ In an appendix to its initial report to the Agency in May 1992, the DPRK included two uranium mines (Wolbisan Uranium Mine and Pyongsan Uranium Mine) and two uranium concentration plants (Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant and Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant).

¹⁵ The Wolbisan Uranium Mine is also known as the Sunchon-Wolbisan Uranium Mine.

¹⁶ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 17.

¹⁷ GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24, para. 29.

¹⁸ The Agency has observed ongoing operation of the 5MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant at Yongbyon, but cannot determine the location where the natural uranium metal fuel used in the latest operation cycles was fabricated. See also GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, section C.2.1, paras 19-26.

¹⁹ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 26, GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20, paras 14 and 15, GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para. 15.

UF₄ Production Process Building. On five separate occasions during the reporting period, the Agency observed indications of processing campaigns at the renovated UF₄ Production Process Building.

18. As previously reported,²⁰ between 2009 and 2019, the Agency observed some buildings being renovated and new buildings being constructed in the south-eastern corner of the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. While the Agency is unable to determine the purpose of these buildings, based on their location and configuration, they may be related to conversion and fuel fabrication. During the reporting period, there were indications of ongoing activities in these buildings.

19. As previously reported,²¹ in March 2023 the Agency observed the start of construction of a group of four new buildings in the southern part of the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. Two of these buildings, which are secured within a common perimeter wall, have features consistent with chemical processing activities. No activity was observed at this group of buildings during the reporting period, and there are indications that internal construction work has yet to be completed.

D.3. Enrichment

D.3.1. Uranium Enrichment Facility at Kangson

20. The Agency has previously reported²² on a complex of buildings within a security perimeter at Kangson, in the vicinity of Pyongyang, which was visited by General Secretary Kim on 13 September 2024, and which was reported by the DPRK state media as “the production base of weapon grade nuclear materials”.²³ The Agency refers to this location as Kangson Uranium Enrichment Facility (Kangson UEF). Also, as previously reported,²⁴ between February and April 2024, an annex was constructed along the south-western side of the main building of Kangson UEF, thereby expanding the available floorspace.²⁵

21. During the reporting period, there were indications of ongoing activities at Kangson UEF. Beginning in January 2026, there were also indications that operations had commenced within its annex.

D.3.2. Uranium Enrichment Facilities at the Yongbyon Site

D.3.2.1 Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Facility 1

22. As previously reported,²⁶ in November 2010, a group of individuals from outside the DPRK, including Dr Siegfried Hecker,²⁷ was shown what appeared to be a centrifuge enrichment facility located in the Rod Production Process Plant of the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant at the Yongbyon site.

²⁰ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 32; GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para 16.

²¹ GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20, para. 17, GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para. 17.

²² GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, paras 17-20.

²³ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 9.

²⁴ GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para. 20.

²⁵ The photographs from the 13 September 2024 visit are consistent with twelve cascades, each comprised of 344 centrifuges, on the lower floor of the main building, and the photograph of the upper floor of the annex shows additional cascades, some complete and some still being installed. There are indications that the cascades depicted in the photographs are all configured for LEU production. Since the location was reported by the DPRK as “the production base of weapon-grade nuclear materials”, the Agency cannot exclude the possibility that there are cascades configured for the production of high enriched uranium (HEU) elsewhere in the building. See GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 19.

²⁶ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, paras 35, 37 and 38, GOV/2024/42-GC(67)/20, para. 18.

²⁷ Former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory (1986-1997).

Also as previously reported,²⁸ on 29 January 2025, DPRK state media published photographs of General Secretary Kim's visit to the facility, referring to the location as "the nuclear-material production base".²⁹ As an additional uranium enrichment facility has since been established at the Yongbyon site (see Section D.3.2.2 below), the Agency will henceforth refer to the original enrichment facility at Yongbyon as the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Facility 1 (Yongbyon UEF1).

23. During the reporting period, the Agency observed indications that Yongbyon UEF1 continued to operate.

D.3.2.2 Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Facility 2

24. As previously reported,³⁰ in December 2024 the Agency observed the start of construction of a two-storey building with dimensions and features, including internal layout, similar to those of the Kangson UEF, at a location south-west of the 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant at the Yongbyon site. The main building was externally complete by May 2025.

25. Between June and October 2025, electrical supply was connected to the facility, and back-up electrical generators and six cooling units were installed. By late November 2025, all of the buildings in the facility appeared to be externally complete, and the site had been cleared of construction materials. In early 2026, the Agency observed that one of the cooling cells was in operation.

26. As indicated earlier (paragraph 12), DPRK state media published photographs of General Secretary Kim's visit on 3 June 2026 to a "newly-inaugurated nuclear materials production factory", where he praised the further strengthening of the "foundation for the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials by settling the problems decisive in putting the production of nuclear materials on a Juche basis".³¹ Based on a comparison of these photographs to commercially available satellite imagery of the building during its construction, the Agency has identified the location as the new two-storey building at Yongbyon. The Agency will henceforth refer to this location as Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Facility 2 (Yongbyon UEF2).

27. The photographs from the visit indicate that gas centrifuge cascades are installed on both the upper and lower floors of the main building. This building could accommodate up to 28 of the cascades depicted in the photographs. The centrifuges shown in the photographs appear to be of the same type as those previously shown at Kangson UEF and Yongbyon UEF1. Installation of at least one of the cascades depicted in the photographs was incomplete. At least one of the cascades shown in the photographs of Yongbyon UEF2 appears to have a different configuration from the cascades comprised of 344 centrifuges shown in the earlier photographs of Kangson UEF and Yongbyon UEF1.

²⁸ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, paras 10 and 22.

²⁹ The photographs from the 29 January 2025 visit are consistent with six cascades of centrifuges within the section of the building shown to Dr Hecker's group in 2010 (Hall 1), eight cascades in the 2013 extension (Hall 2), and a further six cascades in the annex constructed in 2021-2022. The cascades depicted are consistent with a configuration for the production of LEU. See GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 23.

³⁰ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 26.

³¹ 'Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Gives Field Guidance at Newly-Inaugurated Nuclear Materials Production Factory', KCNA, 4 June 2026.

D.4. Reactors

D.4.1. Graphite Reactors

28. The Agency has observed indications, including the discharge of cooling water, that the 5MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant at Yongbyon continued to operate in its seventh operational cycle throughout the reporting period. Occasional shutdowns of one or two days' duration were also observed.

29. As previously reported,³² construction of the 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant at Yongbyon was halted during the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework and was not resumed. Also as previously reported,³³ work commenced in 2025 to demolish a large part of the unfinished and derelict 50MW(e) Reactor site. The only structures remaining upon the completion of the demolition were the reactor building and its ventilation stack and the spent fuel pond (though the building in which the pond was previously housed had been demolished).

30. Construction of the 200MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant at Taechon, also halted during the 1994 Agreed Framework,³⁴ has not been restarted and the reactor remains unfinished and derelict.

D.4.2. Light Water Reactor

31. After a period of shutdown from the start of the reporting period to the end of November 2025, the Agency observed indications that the Light Water Reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon was in stable operation between early December 2025 and mid-March 2026. The LWR was then shut down until late April 2026, with some indications that maintenance activities were underway. The LWR was operational again from the end of April 2026 to the end of the reporting period, though with a few days of shutdown observed during mid-May 2026. Overall, the Agency has observed that the LWR was operating for approximately two-thirds of the reporting period.

32. As previously reported,³⁵ a group of buildings located south of the LWR compound was externally complete by December 2022. There are indications that these buildings support the fabrication and maintenance of reactor components. Ongoing activity was observed at this location during the reporting period.

D.4.3. IRT Research Reactor

33. The Agency observed indications of the operation of the IRT research reactor for a short period during November and December 2025.

D.5. Reprocessing

34. As previously reported,³⁶ the steam plant that serves only the Radiochemical Laboratory at Yongbyon began almost continuous operation in late January 2025. Operation of the steam plant extended into the start of the current reporting period, coming to an end in early September 2025. This

³² GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24, para. 39; GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para. 22.

³³ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 29.

³⁴ GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24, para. 39; GOV/2024/42-GC(68)/15, para. 22.

³⁵ GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20, para. 24.

³⁶ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 36.

period of steam plant operation is consistent with a campaign to reprocess, in the Radiochemical Laboratory, the irradiated fuel from the 5MW(e) Reactor's sixth operational cycle.³⁷

35. The Agency observed the intermittent operation of the steam plant between April and July 2026. This intermittent operation is consistent with waste treatment or maintenance activity following a reprocessing campaign at the Radiochemical Laboratory.

36. Renovation of the exterior of several buildings at the Radiochemical Laboratory was carried out between March and July 2026.

37. As previously reported,³⁸ between March and June 2025, a semi-buried, rectangular concrete structure, the features of which are consistent with radioactive waste storage, was installed north of the Radiochemical Laboratory and near to an existing waste storage location. During the current reporting period, there were indications that material was being deposited in the new concrete structure, as well as in an adjacent pit.

D.6. Nuclear-Powered Submarine

38. On 25 December 2025, as indicated earlier (paragraph 9), General Secretary Kim visited the construction site of a "nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine".³⁹ The Agency has compared commercial satellite imagery to the photographs of the submarine in an assembly hall and has identified the location as a shipyard in Sinpho. Although these photographs appear to show a complete submarine hull, the Agency cannot determine whether a nuclear reactor has been developed for the submarine and, if so, whether it has already been installed therein.

D.7. Weaponization and Nuclear Testing

39. As previously reported,⁴⁰ at the nuclear test site located near the settlement of Punggye-ri, excavation work at Adit 3 to reopen the test tunnel had possibly been completed by May 2022. As also previously reported,⁴¹ the road to the former Adit 4 entrance at the nuclear test site was restored in 2022 and a small support structure was constructed during April 2023.

40. During the reporting period, there were no indications of significant activity at the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, which remains capable of supporting a nuclear test.⁴²

E. Agency Readiness Activities

41. Once a political agreement has been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return promptly to the DPRK, if requested to do so by the DPRK and subject to approval by the Board of Governors. The DPRK Team within the Department of Safeguards continues to undertake activities

³⁷ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 27.

³⁸ GOV/2025/51-GC(69)/13, para. 37.

³⁹ 'Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Building of Nuclear-powered Strategic Guided Missile Submarine', KCNA, 25 December 2025.

⁴⁰ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 74.

⁴¹ GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 74.

⁴² IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, 3 June 2024.

to maintain the Agency's enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme.

42. All of these efforts related to the Agency's enhanced readiness have been conducted within available resources, including extrabudgetary contributions from a number of Member States.⁴³

F. Summary

43. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement and since April 2009, Agency inspectors have not been present in the DPRK.

44. During the reporting period, the Agency observed further expansion of the DPRK's nuclear programme, including the construction of an additional uranium enrichment facility at the Yongbyon site and indications that operations had commenced within the annex at Kangson UEF. There were also indications at Yongbyon consistent with the ongoing operation of Yongbyon UEF1, the 5MW(e) Reactor and the LWR, and of the completion of a reprocessing campaign at the Radiochemical Laboratory. There were indications of expanded mining, milling and concentration activities at the Pyongsan Uranium Mine and the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant, and ongoing activity at the Wolbisan Uranium Mine.

45. The DPRK's nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern. Since 2021, an expansion in the DPRK's enrichment capacity has been observed, with extensions to existing enrichment facilities at the Yongbyon site and at Kangson, and the construction of an additional uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon. Along with the operation of the 5MW(e) Reactor and the LWR, operation of the Radiochemical Laboratory, and ongoing maintenance of the nuclear test site, these developments are deeply troubling. The continuation and further development of the DPRK's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

46. Concerning the safety of the LWR, the Agency lacks the necessary information to make an assessment. Nuclear safety should always be a paramount consideration when operating a reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the Agency normally supports States in this area.

47. The Director General continues to call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the DPRK.

48. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to return to the DPRK and to strengthen its ability to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme.

⁴³ The commercial satellite imagery, equipment and supplies procured for possible verification and monitoring activities by the Agency in the DPRK have been purchased using extrabudgetary contributions from Member States.



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